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THE CALIFORNIA OPEN-SPACE EASEMENT ACT:
THE EFFICACY OF INDIRECT INCENTIVES
The Open-Space Easement Act of 1974,' like its predeces-
sor, the Open-Space Easement Act of 1969,2 was enacted by the
California Legislature in response to widespread popular con-
cern for the preservation of scenic areas and the enhancement
of the physical appearance of urban areas.' The 1974 Act reiter-
ates the legislature's determination to conserve land in Califor-
nia, and reaffirms its belief that acquisition of open-space ease-
ments is an essential element in local government land use and
planning practices.4 Thus, one of the main objectives of the
1974 revision is to facilitate acquisition of easements by provid-
ing increased incentives for citizens to donate land for public
use.
Numerous other authors have thoroughly examined the
concept of the open-space easement,5 and a detailed analysis
of the subject will not be undertaken in this comment. Consid-
eration will be given to the legislative intent, background and
structure of the 1974 Act, with particular emphasis on the tax
benefits and detriments afforded the grantor of an open-space
easement. The analysis will explore to what extent the 1974
amendments will facilitate the establishment and mainte-
nance of "important physical, social, economic or aesthetic
assets to existing or pending urban development."'
FRAMEWORK OF THE 1974 ACT
The California Legislature carefully outlined what must be
done by the parties in order to create an open-space easement.'
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51070 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
2. Cal. Stats. (1969), ch. 762, § 1, at 1521.
3. Bowden, Article X VIII-Opening the Door to Open Space Control, 1 PAC. L.J.
461, 463 (1970); Comment, The Dilemma of Preserving Open-Space Land-How to
Make Californians an Offer They Can't Refuse, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 284 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Dilemma].
4. Comment, Easements to Preserve Open Space Land, 1 ECOL. L.Q. 728, 735
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Easements].
5. Eveleth, An Appraisal of Techniques to Preserve Open Space, 9 VILL. L. REV.
559 (1964); Easements, supra note 4; Comment, Techniques for Preserving Open
Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622 (1962); Note, Scenic Easements, 8 IDAHo L. REV. 131
(1971); Review of Selected 1974 California Legislation, 6 PAC. L.J. 361 (1975); Note,
Preservation of Open Spaces through Scenic Easements and Greenbelt Zoning, 12
STAN. L. REV. 638 (1960).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51072 (West Supp. 1975).
7. Id. § 51075 et seq.
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The initial section of the Act recites that the legislature in-
tended to create provisions for acquisition of open-space ease-
ments by cities and counties,' and sets out a definition of an
open-space easement which parallels the traditional definitions
of an easement:
[A]ny right or interest in perpetuity or for a term of
years in open-space land acquired by a county or city pur-
suant to this chapter where the deed or other instrument
granting such right or interest imposes restrictions which,
through limitation of future use, will effectively preserve
for public use or enjoyment the natural or scenic character
of such open-space land. An open-space easement shall
contain a covenant with the county or city running with
the land, either in perpetuity or for a term of years, that
the landowner shall not construct or permit the construc-
tion of improvements except those for which the right is
expressly reserved in the instrument provided that such
reservation would not be inconsistent with the purpose of
this chapter and which would not be incompatible with
maintaining and preserving the natural or scenic character
of the land?
The legislature determined that open-space easements are
an effective and viable vehicle for the "maintenance of the
economy of the state,"'' and to assure the "continued availabil-
ity of land for the production of food, fiber, for the enjoyment
of scenic beauty, for recreation and for the use and conserva-
8. Id. §§ 51070, 51075(d).
9. Id. § 51075(d). Compare traditional definitions of an easement: 1) an interest
in land in possession of another, Elliot v. McCombs, 17 Cal. 2d 23, 28, 109 P.2d 329,
333 (1941); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 113, 43 P.2d 788, 790 (1935); Corea v.
Higuera, 153 Cal. 451, 454, 95 P. 882, 884 (1908); 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 405, at 387 (1973) [hereinafter cited as POWELL]; 2) an interest of limited
use or enjoyment, Mosier v. Mead, 45 Cal. 2d 629, 632, 290 P.2d 495, 498 (1955); Moots
v. Kasten, 90 Cal. App. 2d 734, 736, 203 P.2d 537, 539 (1949); POWELL § 405, at 387; 3)
an interest that is protected from interference by third parties, Wright v. Best, 19 Cal.
2d 368, 381, 121 P.2d 702, 710 (1942); POWELL § 405, at 387; 4) an interest that cannot
be terminated at will by the possessor, POWELL § 405, at 387; cf. Wilson v. Abrams, 1
Cal. App. 3d 1030, 1035, 82 Cal. Rptr. 272, 274 (1969); 5) an interest atypical of a
possessory land interest, POWELL § 405, at 387; accord, Zlozower v. Lindenbaum, 100
Cal. App. 766, 771, 281 P. 102, 104 (1929); 6) an interest that can terminate by convey-
ance, POWELL § 407, at 387; accord, Elliot v. McCombs, 17 Cal. 2d 23, 28, 109 P.2d
359, 363 (1941); 7) an interest terminating when the intention of the parties has been
met, or by other events, POWELL § 405, at 387; accord, Irvin v. Petitfils, 44 Cal. App.
2d 496, 499, 112 P.2d 688, 690 (1941); 8) an interest that can be for years or in perpetu-
ity, see In Re North Beach & Mission R.R., 32 Cal. 499, 500 (1867).
10. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51071 (West Supp. 1975).
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tion of natural resources."" It further found that such ease-
ments will be socially, economically and aesthetically benefi-
cial," and well within the realm of public utility and public
expenditure."
Implementing the Provisions of the Act
The provisions designed to make donation of an easement
more attractive for potential grantors and acquisition more
practical for government entities appear in Articles Three
through Five, inclusive, of the 1974 Act.'"
One change in the 1974 Act that should offer substantial
encouragement to landowners is a provision permitting an
easement to be granted for as few as 10 years." The 1969 Act
had the minimum term at 20 years.'6 The 20-year requirement
undoubtedly deterred many potential grantors of open-space
easements, since few property owners were willing to relinquish
all development rights for such a prolonged period of time. In
addition, the 20-year period served to "lock in" the grantor's
assets by minimizing or eliminating any possible liquidity he
or she might have in the land.
The shortened mandatory term, which makes donation of
an easement more attractive for the grantor, also makes the
proposition correspondingly less attractive for the grantee city
or county. To assure maximum motivation for both parties, the
legislature has coupled reduction of the mandatory term with
an interesting renewal procedure that in effect serves to extend
the length of the grant by agreement sub silentio. If the open-
space easement is for a term of years (the number of years must
be specified), the contract shall provide that on the "anniver-
sary date of the acceptance of the . . . easement or on such
other annual date specified. . . a year shall be added automat-
ically to the initial term."' 8 This procedure creates difficulties
if the grantor of the open-space easement should seek to termi-
nate the dedication to the public of such easement.'" The auto-
11. Id.
12. Id. § 51072.
13. Id. § 51073.
14. Id. §§ 51070-73, 51075.
15. Id. § 51081.
16. Cal. Stats. (1969), ch. 762, § 1, at 1521, as amended, CAL. GoV'T CODE § 51081
(West Supp. 1975).
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51081 (West Supp. 1975).
18. Id.
19. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
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matic extension provision increases the life of the easement
and, though it may be a necessary compromise, it effectively
nullifies the liquidity achieved by reducing the term the ease-
ment must be granted for.
The 1974 Act also attempted to facilitate acceptance of an
easement grant by simplifying the bureaucratic procedures
that often accompany governmental transactions. Primarily,
the city or county is not permitted to accept an open-space
easement grant unless it has adopted an open-space plan,2" and
the governing body has set forth specific findings to support
acceptance of each grant." Section 51084 of the Government
Code lists the necessary findings22 and provides that a recital
in the resolution shall establish a conclusive presumption that
all the required conditions have been met.23
In addition, the city or county may require the grantor of
the open-space easement to include in the conveyancing instru-
ment any conditions, covenants, or restrictions the city or
county deems necessary to maintain the natural or scenic char-
acter of the land. 24
20. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 51080 (West Supp. 1975). An open-space plan is defined
as the "open space element of a county or city general plan adopted by the governing
body pursuant to Section 65560 of the Government Code." Id. § 51075(e). Section
65560 provides that an open-space plan shall be an element of the general plan as
required by section 65563 of the Government Code. Section 65563 provides that all
cities and counties shall have an open-space plan for the "comprehensive and long-
range preservation of open space." Since all cities and counties were required to adopt
a final plan by the end of 1973, all jurisdictions that have a general plan qualify for
acquisition of open-space easements.
21. Id. § 51084.
22. Id. § 51084 provides in part:
No grant of an open-space easement shall be accepted by a county or city,
unless the governing body by resolution finds:
(a) That the preservation of the land as open space is consistent with
the general plan of the county or city; and
(b) That the preservation of the land as open space is in the best inter-
est of the county or city. ...
23. Id. In May, 1974, the California Supreme Court in Topanga Ass'n v. County
of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974), stated that in a
zoning variance matter the granting agency must set forth findings based on substan-
tial supporting evidence. 11 Cal. 3d at 511, 522 P.2d at 14, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The
Topanga court reasoned that since a variance affects a vested interest, see Strumsky
v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 44-45, 520 P.2d 29,
40, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974), the administrative agency must comply with the
findings procedure. As a planning agency under the Open-Space Easement Act must
determine whether or not an easement proposal is in the public interest and within
the general plan, it follows that the planning agency must comply with the procedures
set forth in Topanga.
24. CA. GOV'T CODE § 51082 (West Supp. 1975). The purpose of the restrictions
and covenants inserted in the instrument of conveyance is usually to assure that a
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Enforcing the Easement
One likely focal point for litigation is section 51086, the
compliance and enforcement section.2" This section provides
that no building permit may be issued to anyone if the permit
would violate the easement, and that injunctive relief may be
obtained to enforce the easement." The 1974 Act grants stand-
ing to two parties to seek injunctive relief to prevent construc-
tion or other development on the land subject to the open-space
easement: the grantee government may seek an injunction to
stop any prohibited development or to force removal of "any
structure erected in violation of the easement;"27 and the owner
of any property within the city or county "or any resident
thereof" may seek an injunction if the city or county fails to
do so.2" Granting standing to the public permits interested
members of the public to act as watchdogs over the conduct of
local government officers and serves to minimize the effects of
officials' inattentiveness.
Although the Open-Space Easement Act provides for strict
compliance," it also permits termination of the easement
through nonrenewal or abandonment.'" If either the grantor or
the city desires not to renew the easement, that party must
submit a notice of termination or nonrenewal 90 days before
the annual renewal date." Upon such notification the easement
will terminate at the end of the period specified in the grant,
plus any years already added through the automatic renewal
provision."2
subsequent purchaser of the dominant tenement (the land the grantor has dedicated
for the open-space easement) will continue to be burdened by the open-space ease-
ment. See, e.g., W. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 427 et seq. (3d ed. 1965); C. CLARK, COVE-
NANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 92 (2d ed. 1947).
The Open-Space Easement Act of 1974 has numerous other technical provisions
worth mentioning. Section 51081 provides that a conveyance of an open-space ease-
ment shall constitute a dedication to the public.
Section 51085 requires the city or county planning commission to review all pro-
posals for open space grants. Thirty days after the commission has received the pro-
posal (or 60 days if the governing body has granted a 30 day extension), it shall report
to the governing body whether or not the proposal is consistent with the general plan.
Section 51086 allows all public districts to obtain open space through other means,
especially eminent domain.




29. See text accompanying notes 27 & 28 supra.
30. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51090 (West Supp. 1975).
31. Id. § 51081. See text accompanying notes 17 & 18 supra.
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51091 (West Supp. 1975). See text accompanying notes
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As an alternative to nonrenewal, either the grantee govern-
ment or the grantor may seek to have the easement aban-
doned.3 Abandonment of the easement may be accomplished
at any time subsequent to a determination by the city or
county that the open-space easement is no longer serving a
public purpose. 4 The grantor, after abandonment proceedings
have been concluded, must pay a fee equal to 50 percent of the
assessed valuation of the easement," which terminates at the
time the fee is paid by the grantor to the assessor."6 In effect,
the grantor is purchasing the easement back from the city or
county; presumably he would be willing to do so only if faced
with an immediate pecuniary opportunity involving the prop-
erty subject to the easement. It would also appear that the city
or county would seldom have any reason to certify abandon-
ment, and thus lose the easement, unless it were subjected to
intense political pressure exerted by the grantor or a faction
that stood to gain economic benefit as a consequence of the
abandonment.
Necessary protection for the grantor is provided by section
51095 of the Act, which is designed to minimize governmental
abuse of the Easement Act. This section of the Act deals pri-
marily with condemnation proceedings instituted subsequent
to government acceptance of an open-space easement. If the
government attempts to condemn the servient property for
public use, the easement terminates at the time the complaint
in condemnation is filed, and the owners of the property to be
condemned are entitled to compensation equivalent to what
would have been awarded had the land not been burdened by
the easement. Government entities are thus prevented from
taking advantage of the diminished market value of the bur-
dened property in order to acquire the fee at a greatly reduced
cost.
17 & 18 supra.
33. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51092 (West Supp. 1975).
34. The governing body may approve the abandonment if it finds
(1) That no public purpose described in Section 51084 will be served by
keeping the land as open space; and
(2) That the abandonment is not inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter . ...
Id. § 51093(a).
35. Id. § 51093(c). Prior to approval of the abandonment, the assessor deter-
mines the full cash value of the entire parcel as if it were unburdened by the easement
and multiplies that amount by 25 percent. The fee that must be paid is equal to 50
percent of that valuation.
36. Id. § 51093(e).
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Economic Incentives and Preservation of Open Space
The requirement of strict procedural compliance with the
provisions of the Act assures the donee government that it will
obtain an easement that requires little governmental expendi-
ture. Facing increasing governmental costs and the popula-
tion's general reluctance to be subjected to further tax in-
creases, local governments do not and will not take steps to
increase their community's open space if the acquisition will
increase the cost of government operation." Numerous states
have adopted measures to assure the preservation of open
space. Not all utilize California's easement method, but almost
without exception they have, like California, attempted to in-
sure that no financial crisis will be precipitated by the govern-
ment's exercise of its power to create open-space areas."
The need to minimize the financial burdens upon the city
or county acquiring an open-space easement creates obvious
difficulties. The preservation and conservation of open space is
an abstract proposition unless a landowner can be persuaded
to abandon his or her rights to the property. Although the
Open-Space Easement Act of 1974 does not provide for any
specific remuneration to the grantor of an open-space ease-
ment, it appears that the legislature intended that beneficial
tax consequences provide the necessary incentive for land do-
nation.2 Only if the tax benefits accruing to the grantor of an
easement exceed the advantages of immediately developing the
land will the impact of the 1974 Act be significant.
A precise balancing of interests must be achieved if the Act
is to operate effectively. On the one hand, the need for preser-
vation and conservation of open space would appear to dictate
that the tax laws be interpreted liberally, so as to afford the
grantor the maximum tax benefits possible, and thereby stimu-
late numerous grants of open-space land. On the other hand,
the courts should not permit the grantor to take unfair advan-
tage of state and federal laws to the detriment of other taxpay-
37. See TiME, Oct. 16, 1972, at 80.
38. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2520, 76-2521 (Supp. 1973) (the scenic area may
be acquired by gift, purchase, exchange, or condemnation); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
13a-85a (Supp. 1975) (the Commissioner of Transportation may acquire by purchase
or condemnation any land that is deemed to be a scenic highway area); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 33.1-66 (1970) (state highway commissioner may acquire land by gift or purchase for
the preservation of natural beauty adjacent to scenic highways, drawing upon existing
highway funds); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.12.250 (1965) (state highway commission may
acquire title to real property, and the commission is authorized to utilize federal-aid
funds available from the federal government).
39. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 51073 (West Supp. 1975).
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ers who must take up the slack. However, an analysis of proba-
ble tax consequences suggests that potential grantors had best
be prepared to derive maximum satisfaction from their status
as public benefactors. The California property tax provisions
offer considerable benefit to the taxpayer satisfied with rela-
tively small but long-term deductions; however, the avail-
ability of the federal charitable contribution deduction, which
would permit substantial income tax reduction in the year of
the grant, is much less clear.
FEDERAL TAX CONSEQUENCES
The Donation of the Easement
The remainder of this comment will be devoted to an ex-
amination of the federal and state tax consequences of an open-
space easement donation. To simplify the taxation principles
and problems, the analysis will focus upon an individual tax-
payer in a non-business setting, concerned about his or her
personal income tax, and desiring to qualify the granting of an
easement as a charitable contribution on his or her federal
income tax return. 40
Whether a transfer qualifies as a deductible "charitable
contribution" depends on the true nature of the transaction. If
the gift was made "in expectation of the receipt of certain
specific direct economic benefits within the power of the recipi-
ent to bestow directly or indirectly,"'" which otherwise might
not be forthcoming, no "charitable contribution" deduction
will be allowed.4"
The Grant Must be in Perpetuity
It is evident that from the viewpoint of the donor of an
open-space easement, the requirement of complete divestiture
of the owner's interest is a formidable obstacle. 3 The partial
nature of the grant is not a bar, since Internal Revenue Service
Regulations specifically provide that conveyance of an open-
40. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c)(1), which permits a deduction of a charitable
contribution to "a State .. .or any political subdivision" thereof, but only if the
purpose of the contribution is to benefit the public or to provide for an exclusively
public use.
41. Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970).
42. Id.
43. See 2 P-H 1975 FED. TAXES 8212.
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space easement shall be considered a grant of "an undivided
portion of the donor's entire interest in property,"" and so
eligible for deduction. 5 The catch, however, is that the grant
must be in perpetuity. The regulation is specific: to qualify, the
transaction must involve transfer of "an open-space easement
in gross in perpetuity."4
It seems, therefore, that the California Legislature's at-
tempt to encourage easement donations by reducing the man-
datory term to ten years is unlikely to produce the desired
results, since the legislature apparently failed to take into con-
sideration the limitations of this particular applicable federal
tax provision."
Lack of Consideration is an Absolute Requirement
The Sutton case. Even if the taxpayer is willing to resolve
the "entire interest" problem by making a grant in perpetuity,
the charitable deduction is by no means assured. There re-
mains a possibility that the Internal Revenue Service would
categorize the typical open-space easement grant as a non-
deductible quid pro quo transaction. In a 1971 case, Larry G.
Sutton, the Tax Court affirmed a ruling by the Internal Reve-
nue Commissioner that a grant of an easement to a city in
California was not a valid gift.4" The court's decision was based
on evidence tending to establish that the owner had made the
grant in anticipation of economic benefit. 9 In Sutton, the tax-
payer was a fee owner of some undeveloped land. A city ordi-
nance prohibited him from improving the land until the streets
and highways were widened to a specified size.50 The taxpayer
granted an easement to the city which permitted the widening
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(ii) (1975).
45. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(f)(3)(A),(B).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(b)(1)(ii) (1975). See also Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973-2
CUM. BULL. 68; Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 62.
47. In 1968, the Congress of the United States passed the Wild and Scenic Rivers
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1271 et seq. (1970). The Act states that an easement donated for
purposes of the Act may be a valid charitable contribution. under the Internal Revenue
Code so long as the government receives the "right to control the use of the land." An
important distinction to be drawn is whether this provision was intended to meet the
demands of the tax laws or to ensure long-term preservation of wild river areas. In
litigating the deductibility of the donation of an open-space easement, this point would
appear to be arguable.
48. Larry G. Sutton, P-H 1971 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC., § 57.22.
49. Id.
50. WESTMINISTER. CAL., MUNI. ORDINANCE ch. 26 § 8200.20 (date of adoption
unknown).
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of the street; subsequently, he developed part of the land. Since
the taxpayer's primary motive for granting the easement to the
public entity was to facilitate eventual development of his
property, the transaction involved exchange of consideration.
The Tax Court's conclusion that the taxpayer's expectation of
economic benefit barred the deduction strongly suggests that
a grant of easement to a public entity will be considered a
charitable contribution only if there is no reciprocal exchange
of consideration. 5 1
The requirement of gratuitous motive had been previously
touched upon. In Revenue Ruling 64-205,12 the Internal Reve-
nue Service ruled that a gratuitous conveyance to the United
States of America of a restrictive easement was a permissible
charitable contribution within the meaning of section 170 of
the Code. The emphasis in the ruling was on the word "gratui-
tous," and the subsequent holding in Sutton indicated that
absence of an economic motive is a necessary element of a
charitable contribution."
Reduced property taxation as consideration. The difficulty
in this area is created by the 1974 Act's property tax provisions.
In an attempt to provide an immediate inducement to owners
of potential open-space land, the legislature, concurrent with
the enactment of the 1974 Open-Space Easement Act,
amended sections of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code to provide property tax relief for the grantor by adjusting
the tax assessment to reflect the burden of the easement.54
Specifically, the California Revenue and Taxation Code
now contains certain technical provisions for assessment prac-
tices. " Basically, the code requires that "the assessor shall con-
sider the effect upon value of any enforceable restrictions to
which the use of the land may be subjected,""5 and specifically
provides that land is enforceably restricted if it is subject to
51. See also Stubbs v. United States 68-2 U.S. TAX CAS. 9,570 (D. Ariz. 1968),
aff'd, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Transamerica
Corp. v. United States, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968); cf. Citizens & So. Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 243 F. Supp. 900 (D.S.C. 1965); Scheffres P.H. 1969 TAX CT. REP. &
MEM. DEC. 69,041.
52. But see note 51 supra.
53. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 CUM. BULL. 62. See also Rev. Rul. 73-339, 1973-72
CUM. BULL. 68, 69 (deduction will be denied where there is "reasonable expectation of
economic benefit").
54. CAi.. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 402.1.
[Vol. 16
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any open-space easement.57 Therefore, the assessor must use a
capitalization of income method in valuing enforceably re-
stricted land, rather than the fair market value method which
is used in assessing regular residential property." As a result,
the taxpayer stands to benefit from a significant property tax
reduction.
The reduction in property tax might be construed by the
Internal Revenue Service to be a mutual exchange of considera-
tion. Since, under Sutton, anticipated economic benefit to the
grantor would serve to defeat a charitable contribution deduc-
tion, 9 and since the grantor of the open-space easement auto-
matically is afforded preferential property tax treatment, 10 it
could almost always be argued that the gift was motivated
primarily by "anticipated benefit of an economic nature,"',
and thus is not deductible as a charitable contribution under
section 170(c).
The Collman case. In a 1975 case, Collman v.
Commissioner,2 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals implicitly
disapproved the Sutton decision. The court did not overturn
the legal principles set forth in Sutton, but did reject the find-
ings of the Tax Court. 3
57. Id. § 422.
58. Id. § 423. The Code defines the capitalization of income method as assessing
the land at a value equal to its income value, which is determined by the fair rental
value or some other method. The California Legislature has recognized that a lan-
downer must be persuaded to grant an easement to the local government. Bowden,
supra note 4, at 464. See also Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation,
1964 Wis. L. REV. 628, 641 (1964); Dilemma, supra note 3, at 289-290. Section 423 of
the Revenue & Taxation Code provides in part that an enforceable restriction (such
as an open-space easement) shall be taken into consideration when valuing the land.
A burdening easement has usually been determined to decrease the value of the domi-
nant tenement. See, e.g., Borough of Englewood Cliffs v. Allsion's Estate, 69 N.J.
Super. 514, 174 A.2d 631 (1961); Beach Bungalows v. Pushwick Say. Bank, 285 App.
Div. 1069, 133 N.Y.S.2d 712 (1954); People ex rel. City of New York v. Barker, 17
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1939).
59. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
60. See Alden & Shockro, Preferential Assessment of Agricultural Lands: Preser-
vation or Discrimination? 42 S. CAL. L. REV. 59 (1969); Land, Unraveling the Urban
Fringe, 19 HAST. L.J. 421, 432-434 (1968).
61. See Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960); Bogardus v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
62. Collman v. Commissioner, 511 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1975).
63. Id. at 1268-69.
The Sutton court, we feel, drew impermissible inferences from the exist-
ence of a local zoning ordinance and from the taxpayer's attempt after
the conveyance to develop the land.
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In Collman, a plaintiff who faced eventual condemnation
proceedings dedicated to the county a parcel of land for road
construction. The county had promised, in exchange for the
grant, to construct the roads to maximum planned width,
which had the effect of making the land eligible to be rezoned
for commercial purposes. The grant was not conditioned on
rezoning and there was no evidence that Collman was aware of
the county ordinance prohibiting commercial use of land unless
adjacent streets were of ultimate width.
By permitting the charitable deduction, the Coliman court
declined to adopt the reasoning of Sutton, concluding instead
that "the mere existence of a zoning ordinance [which, in con-
junction with the grant, could confer a benefit on the grantor]
• ..cannot be sufficient evidence of economic motivation.' '1 4
Further, the Sutton decision ignored a distinction present in
every reported tax decision disallowing a charitable deduction
for dedication of land to a political subdivision: the fact that
the benefit obtained by the taxpayer was bargained for."
Failure to recognize the "bargaining" distinction would
mousetrap the California landowner by making it virtually
impossible for any open-space easement grant ever to qualify
for the section 170(c) deduction, since the state property tax
reduction is automatic." The Collman court's acceptance of
the distinction indicates that California taxpayers may, after
all, have an'escape route. An analysis of Collman and other
charitable deduction cases suggests an acceptable test. Ini-
tially, it seems that the donor must be unaware of the ordi-
64. Id. at 1268.
65. In all the tax decisions, the taxpayer received a bargained for economic
benefit. Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
1009 (1971) (dedication of land conditioned on receipt of favorable zoning); United
States v. Transamerica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968) (private roadway conveyed
on understanding that city would improve and maintain it as a public street to tax-
payer's benefit); Taynton v. United States, 5 AM. FED. TAX R. 2d 14F6 (E.D. Va. 1960)(land donated pursuant to sales contract with third party and new road would econom-
ically benefit taxpayer's other property); Karl D. Petit, 61 T.C. 634 (1974) (land dedi-
cated in exchange for subdivision concession from local planning board); Charles 0.
Grinslade, 59 T.C. 566 (1973) (land dedicated in exchange for money, other land for
development purposes, and zoning variances); Ackerman Buick, Inc., 1973 P-H Tax
Ct. Mem. 73,224 (1973) (dedication of roadway in exchange for zoning changes);
Jordon Perlmutter, 45 T.C. 311 (1965) (dedication in order to obtain approval of
subdivision).
In Sutton and Coltman there was no evidence that the taxpayer had "bargained"
for an economic benefit.
66. 511 F.2d at 1268.
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nance or statute affording economic benefits. 7 Moreover, it
would appear that the burden would be on the Commissioner
to prove that the taxpayer was aware of the potential economic
benefits. 8 The key element of the test (derived from all cases
other than Sutton)" would be the absence of any economic
benefit that the taxpayer had "bargained for" and actually
anticipated.10
The first three elements of the test rely heavily upon the
intent doctrine set forth in Commissioner v. Duberstein,71 the
seminal case on the nature of a "gift" for income tax purposes.
If the intention of the grantor of an open-space easement is not
to benefit himself economically, a charitable contribution de-
duction should be allowed.
The Collman court's conclusion that the existence of prop-
erty tax relief should not automatically bar any possibility of
a federal income tax deduction is predicated upon its implicit
belief that charitable contributions should be encouraged and
not discouraged by the Commissioner. 7 The basis for this pref-
erence is found in the congressional intent underlying the char-
itable contribution deduction section of the Internal Revenue
Code. In the opinion of Congress,
The exemption from taxation of money or property de-
voted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of
revenue by its relief from financial burden which would
otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public
funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of
the general welfare.
73
The Collman case increases the potential of the 1974
Open-Space Easement Act in that it has cast doubt on the
viability of Sutton. Although Collman is not conclusive as to
67. Id. at 1269.
68. Id. at 1268. The opinion states that inferences may not be drawn from mere
disbelief of taxpayer's contention. In support of this the court cites Schwab v. Bullock's
Inc., 508 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1974), an anti-trust case.
69. See note 65 supra.
70. Id.
71. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). One of the holdings of
Duberstein was that the critical consideration in determining the existence of a statu-
tory gift or charitable contribution is the transferor's intention. 363 U.S. at 285-86.
72. 511 F.2d at 1268.
73. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938). See also Comment,
Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under Section 170,
1968 UTAH L. REV. 475, 479.
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the problem presented by the donation of an open-space ease-
ment, the test derived from it, and particularly the increased
evidentiary burden on the government, promises to improve
the situation of California taxpayers.
On the other hand, Coliman did not involve an open-space
easement grant, and there remains the possibility that courts
might consider the state property tax reduction a "bargained
for" or pre-arranged ecomomic benefit. If so, the "escape
route" offered by Coliman will prove illusory, and the Califor-
nia grantor will once again find himself caught in a trap of
looking-glass logic. It seems likely that an argument for distin-
guishing a true pre-arranged benefit from a statutorily-
imposed benefit could be made successfully. Otherwise, a gran-
tor proceeding with true donative intent, and the recipient of
a property tax reduction which in fact is irrelevant to his mo-
tive, will be denied the deduction. Further, the congressional
and judicial preference for liberality in the charitable contribu-
tion area should support the argument.74
Treatment of Termination Fees Under the 1974 Act
Also of concern for federal taxpayers is the treatment of
abandonment fees under the 1974 Open-Space Easement Act.
Section 51093 of the 1974 Act" permits the grantor of an open-
space easement and the local government to agree to an aban-
donment of the easement." Upon completion of the abandon-
ment proceedings, the grantor must pay a fee to the county
treasurer equal to 50 percent of the abandonment valuation of
the easement before title is returned to him." The deductibility
of the fee on the federal tax return is dependent upon the
interpretation given to the fee by the Internal Revenue Service.
If it is construed as a payment for accrued back property taxes,
the taxpayer will be allowed an itemized deduction on his or
her federal return under the general provision permitting de-
duction of local property taxes.7 8 If the fee is construed as a
penalty for failure to comply with provisions of the Open-Space
Easement Act, no deduction will be allowed.7"
74. Id. See also 511 F.2d at 1268.
75. CALr. GOV'T CODE § 51070 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
76. Id. § 51093.
77. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
78. Id.
79. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 16 4 (a)(1).
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California's provision for deductibility of termination fees,
section 17299.1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code,8 ° appears
to offer the only concrete indication of how the termination fee
will be treated by the Internal Revenue Service. According to
section 17299.1, an individual paying California income taxes'
will not be permitted to deduct the termination fee on his or
her California return. 2 Since California's personal income tax-
ation system is similar in many respects to the federal personal
income taxation system, 3 the California Legislature's classifi-
cation of the abandonment fee as a non-deductible expense
suggests that similar treatment would be afforded the fee in the
federal system. 4
It is equally unlikely that the termination fee would be
deductible as a personal expense. To ascertain the federal tax
effect of an expenditure connected with property, the effect and
purpose of the expenditure must be determined. 5 An expendi-
ture which neither adds to the value of the property, nor appre-
ciably prolongs the life of the property, nor increases the adapt-
ability of the land for another use, is a non-deductible ex-
pense.86 If the outlay accomplishes any one of the above, it will
be considered a capital expenditure and will be included in the
adjusted basis of the property when it is sold. 7 The fact that
the payment of the fee is not completely voluntary is immater-
ial. 8
Although the law is unsettled, the economic consequences
of paying termination fees under the Open-Space Easement
Act suggest that the Internal Revenue Service will treat the fee
outlay as a capital expenditure. Prior to the abandonment or
nonrenewal of the easement, the grantor's main parcel is bur-
dened with the open-space easement. If the assessor has fol-
lowed the proper procedure, the grantor has been the benefici-
ary of decreased property valuation. 9 Should he or she attempt
80. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17299.1 (West Supp. 1975).
81. Id. §§ 17004, 17014 (West 1970).
82. Id. § 17299.1.
83. Holmes v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 426, 430, 110 P.2d 428, 430 (1941); Rihn v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 131 Cal. App. 2d 356, 360, 280 P.2d 893, 895 (1955); Meanley v.
McColgan 49 Ca. App. 2d 313, 317, 121 P.2d 772, 774 (1942).
84. See note 91 infra.
85. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)(1) (1960).
86. Estate of Manierre CCH DEC. 1452, 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926) (commissioner
acquiesced); INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 262.
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)(1) (1960).
88. Woolrich Mills v. United States, 289 F.2d 444 (3rd Cir. 1961).
89. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 402.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1975).
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to sell the burdened parcel, the grantor would ask a price ap-
propriate for land burdened by an easement. However, if the
termination fee is paid and the easement abandoned, the gran-
tor once again owns the land free and clear of any burden."° The
land would then command a price commensurate with its un-
burdened status, which will be greater than that of land bur-
dened by an easement. Therefore, since the outlay has served
to increase the value of the land, the expense must be capital-
ized and the grantor's basis accordingly adjusted upward.' The
net effect of this increase in basis is to decrease the amount of
taxable capital gain the grantor will realize on sale of the prop-
erty.
GOAL FOR A PROGRESSIVE LEGISLATURE
California has often been given credit for originating mod-
em concepts of preservation of scenic areas. The passage of the
Coastal Initiative in 197292 clearly established that the Califor-
nia electorate is deeply concerned with the preservation of val-
uable scenic lands. Within this ubiquitous concern for the pro-
tection of the outdoors is an implied logic of orderly preserva-
tion. The passage of the Coastal Initiative"3 indicates that the
electorate desires a concerted land-preservation effort. A major
distinction between the Coastal Initiative and the Open-Space
Easement Act is that the goals sought by the Initiative and
methods to be utilized by the Coastal Commission are
specified, 4 while the goals of the Open-Space Easement Act
are not clearly defined.
To insure that the desires of the people of California are
90. CAl.. GOV'T CODE § 51094 (West Supp. 1975).
91. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1011(a), 1016(a)(1). "Basis" is defined as cost:
specifically, historic cost. Hinckley v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1969).
Section 1016 requires upward adjustment of the basis to include capital expenditures
on property. The adjusted basis is then used to compute gain or loss realized upon
subsequent sale of the property.
92. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975). The Coastal Zone
Conservation Act was proposed by initiative petition (1972) and approved by the voters
at a general election held November 7, 1972.
93. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1975) provides for prelimi-
nary studies and subsequent design of a comprehensive scheme for preservation of
coastal lands. Development is to be restricted. The Commission that supervises the
implementation of the Act has quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers. Acting as
a legislative body, it is empowered to set forth specific policies, plans and regulations
for coastal development. Id. §§ 27300-405. The judicial function is to hold hearings and
to seek remedies penalizing and enjoining violations of the law. Id. § 27405 et seq..
.94. See note 93 supra.
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realized, the legislature should attempt to reorganize and but-
tress the Open-Space Easement Act. As it now stands, the Act
is not sufficiently effective to ensure the granting of a signifi-
cant number of open-space easements. The provisions of the
Act do not offer strong incentive for gratuitous donations, and
the legislature did not allocate funds for the acquisition of
open-space easements, 5 nor has there been a concerted effort
by local or state government to obtain such easements. The
type of program necessary in California is one that sets forth
specific and attainable goals and provides a fund for the pur-
chase of open-space easements.
California is mistaken in its reliance upon the intricacies
of the tax system to provide the necessary incentive for the
granting of easements. An excellent example of what might be
accomplished through a unified approach to an open-space
easement program is Wisconsin's Resource Development and
Outdoor Recreation Act of 1961.96 The Wisconsin Act estab-
lished a fund of $50 million for the purchase of easements for
open space over a 10 year period. 7 As of 1968, the state had not
kept pace with its timetable for acquisition;" however, Wiscon-
sin's achievements in the acquisition of open space clearly sur-
passed California's success under the Open-Space Easement
Act of 1969.11 After only a few years of the program, the state
of Wisconsin had acquired 1125 scenic easement parcels,"0
which included 12,500 acres and 282 miles of highway fron-
tage.' "' Since the California program is not a complete one, no
statistics are readily available to determine its success with
exactness. However, in a 1971 survey a researcher found that
two years after the passage of the 1969 Act, six California coun-
ties had acquired a total of only 22 parcels of land, and the
acreage involved was insubstantial.102
In addition, many of the governments which acquired
easements under the Act did not receive the grants in perpetu-
95. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16142 (West Supp. 1975) which specifically excludes state
subventions for easements granted pursuant to the Open-Space Easement Act of 1974.
96. WIs. STAT. 15.60 et seq. (1969).
97. WIS. STAT. 15.60(6)(i)(1969). See also Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the
Highway Beautification Program, 45 DENVER L. REV. 167, 194 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Cunningham].
98. Cunningham, supra note 97, at 192.
99. Easements, supra note 4, at 735.
100. Cunningham, supra note 97, at 192 n.125.
101. Id. at 193 n.126.
102. See note 4 supra.
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ity. '°3 In Wisconsin, since the easement is purchased outright,
the state obtains title to and possession of the property and can
proceed with legitimate planning and utilization of the land as
it sees fit. In contrast, local governments in California are
placed in the predicament of not being able to use the open-
space easements in long-range planning.
In order for California to accomplish long-range preserva-
tion of open space, the legislature must implement a program
designed to maximize the ability of state and local govern-
ments to acquire and use open-space areas. To accomplish this,
additional legislation should be enacted. First, the goals of the
open-space easement program should be narrowly defined and
limited. Most open-space acquisition programs, including Wis-
consin's, specifically limit the purchase program to designated
areas, particularly those that have great aesthetic value and
are most susceptible to the type of development that is likely
to produce adverse ecological and aesthetic effects.'"4 By limit-
ing the goals of the program in this way (and providing a state
purchasing fund), the California Legislature could maximize
the effectiveness of expenditures for open-space easements;
further, the areas most endangered and of most potential value
would be taken care of rapidly, without dependence upon local
action for preservation.
Second, the legislature should rely upon direct economic
incentives to induce persons to grant open-space easements
rather than upon relatively indirect tax incentives. As has been
discussed, the rigidity of the tax structure casts doubt on the
availability of any major federal tax benefits for the grantor of
an easement. Because the donation of an easement may not
qualify for a charitable contribution deduction, the only tax
advantage available to the grantor is the reduced property tax-
ation. Since local governments pressed for funds may very well
be unwilling to surrender substantial tax revenue by accepting
property offered by an open-space easement, the net effect of
the property tax reduction may be negative. It is the local
community that has the burden of financing the open-space
program,' 5 and the smaller the community the less able it is
to bear the burden of decreased property tax revenue. If the
103. Id.
104. Note, Progress and Problems in Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation Ease-
ment Program, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 352 (1965).
105. See note 95 supra.
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state were to finance the acquisition of open-space easements,
the cost of the program would be spread out among all the
taxpayers of California and would afford those communities
that have opportunities to acquire open-space easements the
ability to do so.
Implementing a narrowly defined, adequately funded
open-space easement acquisition program would assure the
preservation of areas now endangered by development. Passage
of the Coastal Initiative clearly indicates that the people of
California would support such a program.
CONCLUSION
It appears that the Open-Space Easement Act of 1974 may
be severely disabled even before it has'an opportunity to func-
tion. The piecemeal legislation that has created the open-space
program, and the counterproductive property tax provisions,
do little to assure successful implementation of the policies
behind the Act. The intended tax incentives are unlikely to
stimulate donations since the grantor who donates an open-
space easement stands to lose in two ways: first, if the local
government decides to terminate the easement, the grantor will
be liable for a substantial termination fee;' and second, the
grantor may be afforded only long-term tax relief, which might
not be the type of tax benefit he or she needs." 7
A better approach would be creation by the legislature of
a single organized program for acquisition of open-space areas.
Such a program would require establishing a state fund to be
used for the purchase of easements. Other states, notably Wis-
consin, have instituted open-space easement programs that are
rewarding for both the grantor and the public. 8 The grantor
receives direct payment and probable capital gain treatment
for the amount realized on the sale of the land,' and the public
benefits by the preservation of open-space land acquired and
administered under a program guaranteeing coordination and
expertise.
Laurence M. May
106. See text accompanying notes 33-36 supra.
107. See text accompanying notes 48-74 supra.
108. See text accompanying notes 97-102 supra.
109. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1011.
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